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The COVID-19 pandemic has been unequivocally proven an exceptional，severe “strategic surprise” to the international community in 2020. France has been dealt a great blow on various fronts，from economy to politics，from social governance to foreign policy and more. Still，on balance，it has withstood the shock.

In terms of party politics，the centrist parties retained their edge in the municipal elections and senate partial elections despite a considerable mutation in the reconfiguration of the parties as illustrated by La République En Marche being relegated in the Senate to the role of a minority from its original position of absolute majority and landing in the National Assembly a relative majority only. In terms of fighting the pandemic，the Macron administration acted assertively and decisively，showing a considerable dose of resilience in its anti-pandemic policies which were marred at times by inconsistencies. The government also implemented a specific set of anti-pandemic measures for education establishments and scientific research institutions，although those measures in campus have attracted considerable criticisms and controversy.

As for its economy，the Fifth Republic witnessed its worst ever recession since its founding. The government responded by letting out massive economic rescue and recovery packages as well as revitalization plans. Also，it vigorously deployed the strategies of relocating industry chains and piloting the digital and green transformation and transitioning of its economy. Still，beset，as it was，by a host of challenges，from epidemic control to fiscal deficit and regaining of competitiveness，French economy was ill-positioned to achieve full recovery any time soon. It would very much be an uphill struggle for France to maintain its position as the top FDI destination in Europe.

On the front of social governance，the conflicts inhering in French society and the underlying deep-rooted governance dilemmas were laid bare by protest movements of various sizes，ranging from year-beginning anti-pension reform demonstrations to protests against so-called “religious terrorism” in the wake of the murder of the middle school teacher Samuel Paty，massive campaigns denouncing the “comprehensive security law” and protests targeting COVID-19 combating measures. The extremist terror attack against Samuel Paty also triggered a “war of words” between Emmanuel Macron and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as diplomatic tussle between France and a number of Islamic countries.

On the front of foreign policy，in a bid to advance Paris’ strategic autonomy，Emmanuel Macron continued to hold high the great banner of Gaullism，albeit mostly rhetorically. On the factual level，his administration largely marched in lockstep with Washington on a full range of international issues，seemingly striving for a “US-EU condominium”. In Asia-Pacific，on the heels of Washington and its allies labelling China a “systemic rival”，Paris put in place a defense-driven Indo-Pacific strategy in an attempt to consolidate Paris and Brussels’ purported role as a “global security provider”. In the Middle East，leveraging its traditional connections as well as unexpected events，France intervened in Lebanese politics and thus endeavored to take on the mantle of the “policeman of the Middle East” in the place of Washington. In Africa，its traditional sphere of influence，France adjusted its aid policy，but arguably always aimed at securing its privileges on the continent. Nevertheless，to achieve its foreign policy goals globally，Paris is constrained by two structural factors，namely，the relative decline of France’s national power and its identity as a former colonial empire.